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Meaningful Involvement in Collections: 
Should Ethics or the FDCPA Govern? 
 
Jeffrey S. Peters* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Under federal law, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA”) protects consumer-debtors from abusive debt collection 
practices.
1
  Many FDCPA lawsuits stem from debtors’ confusion with 
the wording of a debt collection letter sent on law firm letterhead.
2
  
While the FDCPA makes no mention of the amount of involvement 
necessary for an attorney to refrain from misleading a debtor, the 
judicially created doctrine of “meaningful involvement”3 has developed 
to essentially provide debtors with a cause of action against attorneys. 
Nevertheless, violations of this doctrine border on violations of the 
American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“MRPC”).4  The MRPC provides the professional standards by 
which lawyers are to abide “for purposes of professional discipline.”5  
Each state, with the exception of California, has adopted ethical rules in 
the format of the MRPC to govern attorney conduct.
6
  But, “[t]he Rules 
of Professional Conduct are [not] intended . . . to create civil liability.”7  
 
  * J.D. Candidate, Pace University School of Law (2014); B.S., The Pennsylvania 
State University (2010).  I would like to thank my family and friends for their support 
throughout law school.  I would like to give special thanks to my brother, Michael J. 
Peters, Esq., for sparking my interest in this topic.  Lastly, I would like to thank my 
colleagues on PACE LAW REVIEW for their work in the editing process of this Note. 
1. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2012). 
2. A debt collection letter is known as a “dunning letter.”  For a discussion of case 
law see infra Part IV. 
3. See infra Part IV. 
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013). 
5. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Scope ¶ 14 (2013). 
6. State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A.B.A. CTR. 
FOR PROF’L RESP., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules
_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Aug. 
30, 2014). 
7. Eddis v. Midland Funding, L.L.C., No. 11-3923 (JBS/AMD), 2012 WL 664812, 
at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2012) (quoting Cohen v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P, No. 08-
1
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However, in light of a New Jersey joint-committee ethics opinion 
(“Ethics Opinion”),8 which determined that sending a debt collection 
letter on law firm letterhead is “the practice of law” and a violation of 
New Jersey’s Rules of Professional Conduct absent attorney 
involvement,
9
 violations of state ethical codes are, in essence, the basis 
for civil liability against attorney conduct under the FDCPA.  Which 
brings us to the question: Should ethics or the FDCPA govern 
“meaningful involvement” in collections?  In order to explore the answer 
to this question, a discussion of FDCPA case law and the Ethics 
Opinion’s impact on attorneys is necessary because violating state ethical 
codes are “a matter of concern to the states”10 and purportedly outside 
the scope of the FDCPA.
11
 
This Note will explain and analyze the FDCPA and its case law.  It 
will also discuss the interplay between the FDCPA case law and its 
ethical overtones.  To understand the basis of this issue, Part II of this 
Note will begin by briefly developing the history and background of the 
FDCPA
12
 and discuss specific sections of the law designed to protect 
debtors from abusive debt collection practices.
13
  Notably, these sections 
relate to the prevention of improper practices for misleading debtors,
14
 
and are the focus of the lawsuits that this Note will discuss.  
Accordingly, Part III will briefly discuss what a dunning letter is and the 
similarities of the two standards of review used by the federal courts of 
appeals to determine whether a dunning letter is misleading.
15
  Part IV of 
this Note will discuss the judicially created doctrine of “meaningful 
 
1084 (SRC), 2008 WL 4513569, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2008) (citing Baxt v. Liloia, 714 
A.2d 271, 277 (N.J. 1998))); see also Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, 
P.A., 750 P.2d 118, 123 (N.M. 1988); Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, 
P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Tenn. 1991) (quoting Terry Cove North, Inc. v. Marr & 
Friedlander, P.C., 521 So. 2d 22, 23 (Ala. 1988) (“The Code of Professional 
Responsibility is designed not to create a private cause of action for infractions of 
disciplinary rules, but to establish a remedy solely disciplinary in nature.”)). 
8. Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law Opinion 48; Advisory Comm. on 
Prof’l Ethics Opinion 725, 208 N.J. L.J. 58, 58 (2012) [hereinafter Ethics Opinion]. 
9. See Don Maurice, NJ Ethics Opinion Deems Sending Collection Letters as the 
Practice of Law, THE CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES BLOG (June 4, 2012), 
http://consumerfsblog.com/2012/06/nj-ethics-opinion-deems-sending-collection-letters-
as-the-practice-of-law/. 
10. Cohen, 2008 WL 4513569, at *7. 
11. Id. at 7-8 (discussing the purpose of the FDCPA). 
12. See infra Part II.A. 
13. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692g (2012); see also infra Parts II.C.1-2. 
14. §§ 1692e, 1692g. 
15. See infra Part III. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/7
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involvement” and how the federal courts have allowed attorneys to 
include an appropriate disclosure of the level of involvement.
16
  Part V of 
this Note will discuss the Ethics Opinion in detail and its resulting impact 
on disclaiming attorney involvement.
17
  Specifically, this Note will 
address the direct conflict between the Ethics Opinion and federal case 
law, which allows attorneys to disclaim their involvement when sending 
an initial communication under the FDCPA.
18
  Finally, Part VI will 
propose a solution to resolve the conflict between the varying case law 
and the ethical issues presented.
19
 
The courts must correct the lack of uniformity in applying the 
FDCPA in order for consumer-debtors and debt collection attorneys to 
better understand how the FDCPA applies.  Additionally, because the 
statutory language of the FDCPA does not include the words 
“meaningful involvement,” it is important for the federal courts to have 
guidance in applying this doctrine uniformly.  A congressional 
amendment to include the words is rather unlikely, and would not solve 
the issue.  Even if the words were added to the statutory language, this 
would seemingly impose ethical-like violations—a matter for the states 
to handle—into federal legislation.  The FDCPA should not be the place 
for ethical issues, as each state has the power to discipline their own 
attorneys by enforcing violations of the unauthorized practice of law, just 
as New Jersey has proposed in its Ethics Opinion.  Furthermore, this 
would eliminate the use of a disclaimer in dunning letters and increase 
uniformity across the country. 
However, if these ethically focused “meaningful involvement” 
lawsuits under the FDCPA continue to go forward, the presumption in 
each case should be that the attorney has maintained the requisite 
standard of ethical behavior.  This presumption should be a high one, 
having the plaintiff prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
attorney violated ethical responsibilities, and thus violated the FDCPA.  
This may limit plaintiff lawsuits to those the FDCPA was implemented 
to protect: where law firm letterhead was lent to a debt collection agency 
without any attorney involvement.  To begin exploring this issue, it is 
important to review the FDCPA. 
 
 
16. See infra Part IV. 
17. See infra Part V. 
18. See, e.g., Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
19. See infra Part VI. 
3
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II. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
 
A. History and Background 
 
After finding that there was “abundant evidence of the use of 
abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt 
collectors,”20 Congress enacted the FDCPA in 197721 to protect debtors 
in the consumer-debt context.
22
  The FDCPA protects any 
“communication” that a debtor receives from a debt collector.23  The 
term “debt collector” has been construed broadly and is said to be 
separated into two parts
24: 1) “any person who uses any instrumentality 
of interstate commerce or the mails in any business”25 and 2) “any 
business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or 
who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts 
owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”26  Under the original 
language of the FDCPA, attorneys were exempt from the definition of a 
debt collector.
27
  Not only were attorneys participating in some of the 
same abusive debt collection practices,
28
 they were “boasting that they 
had an advantage over other debt collectors because they did not have to 
comply with the FDCPA.”29  The provision which originally exempted 
 
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2012). 
21. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, §§ 802-818, 91 Stat. 
874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p). 
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (“the subject of the transaction [is] primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes”). 
23. Id. § 1692a(2) (stating that a “communication” is “the conveying of information 
regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium”). 
24. See Christian Stueben, Note, Judge or Jury? Determining Deception or 
Misrepresentation Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3107, 3115 & n.52 (2010) (citing § 1692(a)(6); Scott J. Burnham, What Attorneys Should 
Know About the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or, the 2 Do’s and the 200 Don’ts of 
Debt Collection, 59 MONT. L. REV. 179, 185-86 (1998)). 
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 
26. Id. 
27. See Eric M. Berman, Why Changes Must be Made to the Standards of Review 
Used to Determine Meaningful Attorney Involvement Under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 2 (2003) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F) 
(1977) (excluding any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in 
the name of a client)). 
28. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-405, at 4-5 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752, 
1754-56. 
29. Burnham, supra note 24, at 185. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/7
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attorneys was amended in 1986.
30
  However, one question remained: 
whether the 1986 amendment addressed attorneys who were regularly 
trying to collect debts through litigation without being in the debt 
collection business.
31
  The 1995 Supreme Court decision in Heintz v. 
Jenkins,
32
 resolved this issue when a unanimous Court held that the 1986 
amendment extended to protect attorneys who “regularly” perform debt 
collection practices.
33
  In light of this decision and the Seventh Circuit’s 
subsequent decision in Jenkins v. Heintz,
34
 the issue of the ethical 
responsibility of an attorney in the debt collection practice remained 
open and leads to a discussion of the purpose of the FDCPA. 
 
B. The Purpose of the FDCPA 
 
Congress determined there are “means other than misrepresentation 
or other abusive debt collection practices”35 available to debt collectors.  
Thus, the established purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive 
debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt 
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt practices are not 
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to 
protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”36  However, the 
“FDCPA is not intended to enable consumers to avoid paying their 
legitimate debts.”37  It is intended to allow debtors to repay those debts 
without being subject to misrepresentations, fraud, and other abusive 
practices by debt collectors.
38
  Consequently, an examination of several 
 
30. See An Act to Amend the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
361, § 803(6), 100 Stat. 768 (1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6) 
(2012)). 
31. See Burnham, supra note 24, at 185. 
32. 514 U.S. 291 (1995). 
33. Id. at 299. 
34. 124 F.3d 824, 826 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that defendants’ attorneys were 
protected from liability because there was no obligation to investigate the validity of the 
debt prior to filing a lawsuit). 
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c). 
36. Id. § 1692(e) (emphasis added). 
37. Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt 
Collection After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 720 (2006) (citing Lynn A.S. Araki, 
Comment, Rx for Abusive Debt Collection Practices: Amend the FDCPA, 17 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 69, 77 (1995)). 
38. See id. (citing David A. Schulman, The Effectiveness of Federal Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 2 BANK. DEV. J. 171, 172 (1985) (quoting 123 CONG. 
REC. 10,241 (1977) (“[E]very individual, whether or not he owes a debt, has the right to 
be treated in a reasonable and civil manner.”))). 
5
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statutory provisions of the FDCPA is appropriate to show how the 
objectives of the law are met. 
 
C. Key Statutory Provisions 
 
1.  Section 1692e – False or Misleading Representations 
 
Section 1692e of the FDCPA provides sixteen examples of conduct 
which are each considered a violation of the FDCPA based on false or 
misleading representations by debt collectors in communications with 
debtors.
39
  For purposes of this Note, the two main subsections of § 
1692e that will be discussed are subsection (3) and subsection (10).  
Section 1692e(3) prohibits “the false representation or implication that 
any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an 
attorney.”40  Section 1692e(10) prohibits “the use of any false 
representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any 
debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.”41  Violations of 
these provisions generally occur when several interpretations of the debt 
collection letter sent to a debtor can be discerned, causing him or her to 
be misled.
42
  Another violation of § 1692e occurs when the judicially 
created doctrine of “meaningful involvement” is violated.43  Notably 
absent from § 1692e are the words “meaningful involvement.”44  A more 
in-depth discussion of this doctrine will be featured in Part IV.
45
 
 
2.  Section 1692g – Validation of Debts 
 
Section 1692g provides the requirements that the initial 
communication, usually a debt collection letter, must contain in order to 
comply with the FDCPA.
46
  Section 1692g is another frequently litigated 
section of the FDCPA.
47
  Under § 1692g(a), “within five days after the 
 
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
40. Id. § 1692e(3). 
41. Id. § 1692e(10). 
42. See Stueben, supra note 24, at 3115. 
43. See infra Part IV for case law examples of “meaningful involvement” 
violations. 
44. 15 U.S.C § 1692e. 
45. See infra Part IV. 
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 
47. See Stueben, supra note 24, at 3116 & n.65 (citing Jerry D. Brown, Painting a 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/7
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initial communication” a debtor must receive a written notice from the 
debt collector that contains the following:  
 
(1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor 
to whom the debt is owed; (3) a statement that unless the 
consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, 
disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, 
the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt 
collector; (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the 
debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that 
the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt 
collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of 
a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such 
verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer 
by the debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the 
consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, 
the debt collector will provide the consumer with the 
name and address of the original creditor, if different 
from the current creditor.
48
 
 
Section 1692g(b) includes a required moratorium on debt collection 
practices if the debtor disputes the debt claimed in the communication 
until the debt is verified.
49
  Verification of the debt merely requires that 
the debtor confirm in writing that the amount demanded is what the 
creditor claims it is.
50
  There is no requirement that the debtor forward 
copies of bills or evidence of the debt to the debt collector at that time.
51
  
Nonetheless, failure to respond to dispute the debt is not an admission by 
the debtor that the debt is valid.
52
  There is clearly a nexus in the statute 
between § 1692e and § 1692g because of the necessity of notice 
demonstrated in § 1692g and the requirement that the notice cannot be 
 
Mustache on the Mona Lisa—How Tinkering with the Validation Notice Will Get You 
Every Time, 53 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 42, 42 (1999) (estimating that ninety percent of 
all FDCPA claims come under § 1692g); see also Laurie A. Lucas & Alvin C. Harrell, 
2000 Update in the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 55 BUS. LAW. 1453, 
1454 (2002) (noting that § 1692g is one of the most litigated sections of the FDCPA). 
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)-(5). 
49. Id. § 1692g(b). 
50. Berman, supra note 27, at 23 (citing Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 406 
(4th Cir. 1998)). 
51. Id. 
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(c). 
7
PETERS - FINAL  
2014]  MEANINGFUL INVOLVEMENT IN COLLECTIONS  1247 
false or misleading in § 1692e.  
 
III. Dunning Letters and the Standard of Review for Violations § 1692e 
 
A. What is a Dunning Letter? 
 
The initial letter that a debt collector sends to a debtor is known as a 
dunning letter.
53
  As stated in Part II, several of the requirements for 
dunning letters are found in § 1692g.
54
  Besides satisfying the validation 
requirements of § 1692g, each dunning letter must include the § 
1692e(11) requirement informing the debtor that, “the debt collector is 
attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be 
used for that purpose.”55  This requirement is known as the dunning 
letter’s “Miranda Warning.”56  The warning is meant to inform the debtor 
of the context of the dunning letter and who it is from.
57
  Along with 
those requirements, violations of § 1692e have been reviewed under the 
standards that the least sophisticated consumer or the unsophisticated 
consumer is not deceived by the contents of the dunning letter.  Although 
these standards differ in name,
58
 as discussed below, they are relatively 
the same.
59
 
 
B. The Standards of Review 
 
1.  The Least Sophisticated Consumer 
 
Of the two standards of review for determining whether a dunning 
letter violates § 1692e, the “least sophisticated consumer” standard is the 
“most widely accepted test.”60  Including the Second Circuit, the least 
 
53. See LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1189 n.7 (11th Cir. 
2010) (“Since ‘dunning’ means ‘to make persistent demands upon [another] for 
payment,’ a ‘dunning letter’ may be considered as simply another name for a letter of 
collection.” (quoting Dun Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/dun (last visited Aug. 30, 2014))). 
54. See supra Part II.C.2. 
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). 
56. See Stueben, supra note 24, at 3116 (citing John P. Holahan, Emerging Issues in 
Debt Collection Law, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 267, 268 (2008)). 
57. Id. 
58. See infra Parts III.B.1-2. 
59. See infra Part III.B.3. 
60. Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/7
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sophisticated consumer also has been adopted by the Third,
61
 Fourth,
62
 
Sixth,
63
 Ninth,
64
 and Eleventh
65
 Circuits.  The least sophisticated 
consumer standard is an objective test that “protects all consumers, the 
gullible as well as the shrewd.”66  This standard was adopted because of 
“the assumption that consumers of below-average sophistication or 
intelligence are especially vulnerable to fraudulent schemes.”67  The 
court in Clomon v. Jackson
68
 discussed three reasons that the least 
sophisticated consumer standard protects consumers.
69
  “First, courts 
have held that collection notices violate the FDCPA if the notices contain 
language that ‘overshadows’ or ‘contradicts’ other language that informs 
consumers of their rights.”70  Second, “courts have found collection 
notices misleading where they employ formats or typefaces which tend 
to obscure important information that appears in the notice.”71  Third and 
finally, “courts have held that collection notices can be deceptive if they 
are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which 
is inaccurate.”72  Although this standard adopts a very low burden 
regarding the debtor’s ability to understand a dunning letter, the “concept 
of reasonableness” is still preserved.73  While the Clomon court noted 
that there is a variety of interpretations of the least sophisticated 
consumer standard,
74
 the standard “effectively serves its dual purpose: it 
(1) ensures the protection of all consumers, even the naïve and the 
trusting, against deceptive debt collection practices, and (2) protects debt 
collectors against liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of 
 
61. Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991). 
62. United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 135-36 (4th Cir. 1996). 
63. Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir. 1992). 
64. Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1982). 
65. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (11th Cir. 1985). 
66. Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993). 
67. Id. at 1319. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. (citing Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
71. Id. (citing Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
72. Id. (citing Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 F. Supp. 1130, 1141 (D. Del. 1992)). 
73. Id. (citing Rosa v. Gaynor, 784 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Conn. 1989) (explaining that 
the FDCPA “reach[es] a reasonable interpretation of a [collection] notice by even the 
least sophisticated.”)). 
74. Id.  One example of the variety of interpretations is that, “even the ‘least 
sophisticated consumer’ can be presumed to possess a rudimentary amount of 
information about the real world and a willingness to read a collection notice with some 
care.”  Id. 
9
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collection notices.”75 
 
2.  The Unsophisticated Consumer 
 
The standard of review that has been adopted by the Seventh
76
 and 
Eighth
77
 Circuits for determining whether a dunning letter violates § 
1692e, is the “unsophisticated consumer.”78  While the court in Gammon 
v. GC Services
79
 agreed with the analysis provided by the Second Circuit 
in Clomon
80
 in adopting the least sophisticated consumer standard,
81
 the 
Gammon court noted that a different standard would “relieve the 
incongruity between what the standard would entail if read literally, and 
the way courts have interpreted the standard.”82  The Gammon court 
determined it was “virtually impossible to analyze a debt collection letter 
based on the reasonable interpretations of the least sophisticated 
consumer.”83  Moreover, the Gammon court stated that, “the least 
sophisticated consumer is not merely ‘below average,’ he is the very last 
rung on the sophistication ladder.”84  In continuing its dismantling of the 
standard, the Gammon court further stated that, “[e]ven assuming that he 
would be willing to do so, such a consumer would likely not be able to 
read a collection notice with care (or at all), let alone interpret it in a 
reasonable fashion.”85  Thus, the Gammon court decided that the correct 
term was “unsophisticated” because “the hypothetical consumer . . . who 
is uninformed, naïve, or trusting” has an “objective element of 
reasonableness” to him.86  This reasonableness requirement protects debt 
collectors from “unrealistic or peculiar interpretations of collection 
letters.”87 
 
 
 
75. Id. at 1319-20. 
76. Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994). 
77. Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir. 2000). 
78. See Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1257. 
79. Id. 
80. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318-20. 
81. See Gammon, 27 F.2d at 1257. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/7
  
1250 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  34:3 
3.  What is the Difference and Does it Matter? 
 
Is there really a difference between the least sophisticated consumer 
and the unsophisticated consumer?  In his dissenting opinion in Gonzalez 
v. Kay,
88
 a case where the majority used the least sophisticated consumer 
standard to determine whether a dunning letter violated  § 1692e,
89
 
Circuit Judge E. Grady Jolly noted that the term unsophisticated does not 
mean “illiterate or ignorant or indifferent or careless.”90  Furthermore, 
Circuit Judge Jolly states that “a serious policy consideration is 
implicated here: the uniform application of a federal statute.”91  In a 
similar case, Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC,
92
 Circuit 
Judge Kent A. Jordan also dissented based on reasoning similar to 
Circuit Judge Jolly.
93
  Again, as in Gonzalez, the majority opinion 
applied the least sophisticated consumer standard to a dunning letter that 
purportedly violated § 1692e.
94
  In his dissent, Circuit Judge Jordan uses 
the least sophisticated consumer and unsophisticated consumer monikers 
interchangeably.
95
  On one of his main points, Circuit Judge Jordan 
stated that, “[t]o say that the least sophisticated consumer would not flip 
the page to read the entire letter, particularly when prompted to do so by 
a conspicuous notice on the front of the letter” is to allow the purpose of 
the FDCPA to be frustrated.
96
  Finally, in his concurrence in Gammon, 
Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, part of a court that has rejected the 
least sophisticated consumer standard, opined that the unsophisticated 
consumer is “hypothetical in the same sense as the reasonable person of 
tort law is hypothetical.”97  However, Circuit Judge Easterbrook 
concluded by stating that, “what proportion is high enough, and how the 
extent of misunderstanding will be established, is something the district 
court will have to mull over,” when describing the remanded issue of 
how the unsophisticated consumer will have construed the dunning 
 
88. 577 F.3d 600, 607-12 (5th Cir. 2009) (Jolly, J., dissenting).  For a further 
discussion of Circuit Judge Jolly’s dissent, see Part IV.B.2. 
89. Id. at 605-07 (majority opinion). 
90. Id. at 609 (Jolly, J., dissenting). 
91. Id. at 611. 
92. 650 F.3d 993 (3rd Cir. 2011). 
93. Id. at 1005-07 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
94. Id. at 1003 (majority opinion). 
95. See id. at 1006 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
96. Id. at 1006-07. 
97. Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1259 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
11
PETERS - FINAL  
2014]  MEANINGFUL INVOLVEMENT IN COLLECTIONS  1251 
letter.
98
 
Although these cases have fought with the concepts of the least 
sophisticated consumer and the unsophisticated consumer in determining 
violations of § 1692e, it seems to be more an issue of semantics than of 
an actual difference in the law.
99
  The characteristics of both the least 
sophisticated consumer and the unsophisticated consumer are relatively 
the same.  Due to the need for uniformity, the federal courts should adopt 
one standard that combines the concepts of both the least sophisticated 
consumer and the unsophisticated consumer.  This will make attorneys 
and consumer-debtors aware of the standard that a dunning letter will be 
evaluated by. 
 
IV. Attorney Involvement in the Debt Collection Practice 
 
A. “Meaningful Involvement” 
 
Keeping in mind the standards of review,
100
 attorneys must be aware 
of whether they have misrepresented their status as an attorney in the 
debt collection process.  This issue “has repeatedly reared its head in 
lawsuits.”101  Attorneys can participate in the debt collection process 
directly “by writing letters, pursuing collection, or filing suit to collect 
delinquent debts.”102  However, attorney-debt collectors cannot simply 
lend their letterhead to be attached to a dunning letter without taking a 
meaningful role, as it is a violation of § 1692e(3).
103
  Moreover, because 
the debt collection process of sending dunning letters is “routinely 
mechanized and delegated,”104 attorneys need to have some level of 
 
98. Id. at 1260. 
99. Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit does not 
choose a standard and evaluates cases under both standards.  See McMurray v. 
ProCollect, Inc., 687 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We ‘must evaluate any potential 
deception in the [dunning] letter under an unsophisticated or least sophisticated consumer 
standard.’” (quoting Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 495 (5th 
Cir. 2004))). 
100. See supra Part III.B.1-2. 
101. CCH Incorporated, Circuit Court Ruling Could Impact Collection Letters: Is 
Attorney "Meaningfully Involved"?, 25 NO 4. HEALTH CARE COLLECTOR 3, 3 (2011). 
102. Holahan, supra note 56, at 270. 
103. See Berman, supra note 27, at 5 (citing Boyd v. Wexler, 275 F.3d 642, 644 
(7th Cir. 2001)). 
104. Andrea M. Bergia, Note, No Shelter from the Storm: Dangers from the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act to Mortgage Industry Attorneys and a Call for Legislative 
Action, 29 REV. LITIG. 391, 412 (2010). 
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participation in the process to comport with the requirements of the 
FDCPA. 
What level of attorney involvement is necessary though?  Are these 
lawsuits within the purpose of the FDCPA?  Turning to the statute 
provides no clear answer, as it is devoid of the amount of involvement 
necessary.
105
  Nonetheless, case law interpreting the FDCPA has created 
the doctrine of “meaningful involvement.”106  This may be because 
“[c]ourts recognize that sometimes collection agencies make reference to 
an attorney in its collection demands so as to put additional pressure on 
debtors to pay by threatening further attorney involvement if payments is 
not made.”107  In other words, “the price of poker has just gone up.”108  
One scholar suggests that “meaningful involvement” is related to the 
attorney-client relationship.
109
  However, a precise definition of 
“meaningful involvement” has proved somewhat elusive for the 
courts.
110
  Therefore, examining the case law which has created the 
doctrine is in order. 
 
1.  Beginnings of “Meaningful Involvement” 
 
In Clomon v. Jackson,
111
 the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment 
of the district court which had granted summary judgment for the 
plaintiff-debtor, Christ Clomon, in an action for damages under the 
FDCPA.
112
  Clomon had allegedly owed a debt of $9.42.
113
  After the 
district court granted summary judgment for Clomon, it also granted 
Clomon’s motion for the maximum statutory damages of $1,000.114  
Nevertheless, the district court found no actual damages,
115
 and therefore, 
 
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012). 
106. See Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Clomon v. 
Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1320 (2d Cir. 1993). 
107. CCH Incorporated, supra note 101, at 3. 
108. See Stueben, supra note 24, at 3121 (citing Avila, 84 F.3d at 229). 
109. See Berman, supra note 27, at 4 (stating that “[i]f an attorney-client 
relationship exists in which the attorney is actively participating and providing services to 
his client, and the client benefits from the provision of such services, there is meaningful 
involvement.”). 
110. See id. at 3 (noting that the challenge of whether an attorney is “meaningfully 
involved . . . is quite vexing in application.”). 
111. 988 F.2d at 1314. 
112. See id. at 1316. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1317. 
115. Id. 
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the facts of Clomon should be discussed further. 
As part-time general counsel for the collection agency, a letterhead 
with defendant Jackson’s name and position on it, as well as a copy of 
his signature was printed on five of the six dunning letters sent to 
Clomon.
116
  However, Jackson had no “direct personal involvement” in 
the collection process.
117
  Applying the least sophisticated consumer 
standard,
118
 the Second Circuit held that the use of Jackson’s letterhead 
and signature gave “the impression that the letters were communications 
from an attorney.”119  Moreover, Jackson “played virtually no day-to-day 
role in the debt collection process,” and the dunning letters were “not 
‘from’ Jackson in any meaningful sense of that word.”120  The Clomon 
court reasoned that: 
 
[T]he use of an attorney’s signature on a collection letter 
implies that the letter is “from” the attorney who signed 
it; it implies, in other words, that the attorney directly 
controlled or supervised the process through which the 
letter was sent. . . . [T]he use of an attorney’s signature 
implies—at least in the absence of language to the 
contrary—that the attorney signing the letter formed an 
opinion about how to manage the case of the debtor to 
whom the letter was sent.  In a mass mailing, these 
implications are frequently false: the attorney whose 
signature is used might play no role either in sending the 
letters or in determining who should receive them.  For 
this reason, there will be few, if any, cases in which a 
mass-produced collection letter bearing the facsimile of 
an attorney’s signature will comply with the restrictions 
imposed by § 1692e.
121
 
 
Thus, because Jackson had no real involvement, he violated § 1692e.
122
 
Additionally, in Avila v. Rubin,
123
 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
 
116. Id. at 1316-17. 
117. Id. at 1317. 
118. See supra Part III.B.1. 
119. See Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1320. 
120. Id. (emphasis added). 
121. Id. at 1321 (emphasis added). 
122. Id. 
123. 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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judgment of the district court which had granted summary judgment for 
the plaintiff-debtor, Raul Avila, in a class action claiming violations, 
inter alia, of § 1692e(3).
124
  The Avila court stated that “Clomon 
establishe[d] that an attorney sending dunning letters must be directly 
and personally involved in the mailing of the letters in order to comply 
with the strictures of FDCPA.”125  Under facts similar to Clomon, the 
Avila court, applying the unsophisticated consumer standard,
126
 held that 
Rubin, the defendant-attorney, violated § 1692e(3).
127
  The Avila court 
reasoned that: 
 
A letter from an attorney implies that a real lawyer, 
acting like a lawyer usually acts, directly controlled or 
supervised the process which the letter was sent.  That’s 
the essence of the connotation that accompanies the title 
of ‘attorney.’  A debt collection letter on an attorney’s 
letterhead conveys authority. . . . The attorney letter 
implies that the attorney has reached a considered, 
professional judgment that the debtor is delinquent and 
is a candidate for legal action.  And the letter also 
implies that the attorney has some personal involvement 
in the decision to send the letter.  Thus, if a debt 
collection (attorney or otherwise) wants to take 
advantage of the special connotation of the word 
‘attorney’ in the minds of delinquent consumer debtors 
to better effect collection of the debt, the debt collector 
should at least ensure that an attorney has become 
professionally involved in the debtor’s file.  Any other 
result would sanction the wholesale licensing of an 
attorney’s name for commercial purposes, in derogation 
of professional standards . . . .
128
 
 
Therefore, because the “true source of the ‘attorney’ letters was the 
 
124. See id. at 225. 
125. Id. at 228. 
126. See supra Part III.B.2. 
127. See Avila, 84 F.3d at 229.  The court also noted that Rubin merely reviewed 
and approved the form of dunning letters and a non-attorney ‘legal assistant collector’” 
made the decision on when to send a dunning letter.  Id. at 225. 
128. Id. (emphasis added).  The court also quoted the American Bar Association, 
Formal Op. 68 (1932), for the proposition that public policy requires that attorneys must, 
at the very least, approve correspondence purporting to come from them.  Id. 
15
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collection agent who pressed a button on the agency’s computer,” Rubin 
violated the FDCPA.
129
  These two cases have provided the basis for the 
“meaningful involvement” doctrine, but courts have not attempted to 
further define the doctrine other than providing examples of what is not 
considered “meaningful involvement.”130 
 
2.  The Aftermath of Clomon and Avila 
 
Following the analysis of Clomon and Avila, several courts have 
declined to set a minimum standard for “meaningful involvement.”131  
This may be because “the inquiry is too fact specific” to apply a set 
standard for all cases.
132
  Nevertheless, some explanation of what is 
sufficient to satisfy the standard would provide useful insight to 
determine violations of the FDCPA.  Perhaps the opportunity has yet to 
present itself or perhaps the courts do not want to provide attorneys with 
a roadmap to commit fraudulent acts. 
The court in Boyd v. Wexler
133
 reversed summary judgment for the 
defendant-attorney on the grounds that the affidavit, which stated Wexler 
or attorneys from his firm reviewed client files before issuing a dunning 
letter, had serious doubt casted on it by evidence of the volume of letters 
sent out by his firm.
134
  In declining to set a standard, the Boyd court 
noted that “the ultimate professional judgment concerning the existence 
of a valid debt is reserved to the lawyer.”135 
Moreover, the court in Nielsen v. Dickerson
136
 determined that “in 
all material respects [their] case was on all fours with Avila.”137  
However, the court noted some “minor” distinguishing facts between the 
attorney in their case and the attorneys from Avila, Clomon, and other 
 
129. Id. at 230. 
130. See Berman, supra note 27, at 8. 
131. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 304 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(declining to adopt a minimum standard “to satisfy Clomon’s requirement of meaningful 
attorney involvement.”); Nielsen v. Dickerson, 307 F.3d 623, 638 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting 
that the attorney’s involvement “still fell markedly short of what [Avila and Clomon] 
require”); Boyd v. Wexler, 275 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that the issue of 
“the minimum amount of lawyer review required” to satisfy Avila has not been resolved). 
132. See Stueben, supra note 24, at 3122 (citing Boyd, 275 F.3d at 647; Berman, 
supra note 27, at 1). 
133. 275 F.3d at 642. 
134. See id. at 644-46. 
135. Id. at 647-48; see also Stueben, supra note 24, at 3122. 
136. 307 F.3d at 623. 
137. See id. at 639. 
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cases: 
 
[He] reviewed the master contract governing [the] 
accounts; he looked at the minimal information that [the 
collection agency] provided regarding each overdue 
account, and therefore knew the identities of debtors 
who were to receive the letters; he checked the debtor 
information for typographical errors and to weed out 
debtors who had already received a letter from him, had 
declared bankruptcy, or lived in a prohibited state; and 
he handled letters and phone calls received by his firm to 
the extent of categorizing them and forwarding them to 
[the collection agency].
138
 
 
The Nielsen court found that these “minor” differences “amounted to no 
more than a ‘veneer’ of compliance with the FDCPA.”139  Yet, the court 
failed to establish what an attorney needs to do to have “some 
professional involvement” to comport with § 1692e.140 
Furthermore, the court in Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
141
 
reversed summary judgment for the defendant law firms because the 
plaintiff’s discovery requests were “directly related to the ‘meaningful 
involvement’ claim at issue.”142  The Miller court further reasoned that 
the defendant law firm “merely being told by a client that a debt is 
overdue” does not satisfy the requirements of Clomon.143  Here, the court 
declined to set a minimum standard based on the record available 
because “there may be circumstances where, following discovery, it 
becomes clear that the attorney’s familiarity with the client’s contracts 
and practices would negate the need to review some if not all of the 
documents plaintiff seeks to require.”144 
Nonetheless, the court in Miller v. Upton, Cohen & Slamowitz
145
 
 
138. Id. at 638 (internal citations omitted). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. 321 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 2003). 
142. See id. at 303.  The court found that the affidavits provided by attorneys for the 
defendants stating that they reviewed files and confirmed that there were debts 
outstanding were insufficient as a matter of law to detail the amount of attorney 
involvement and, thus, more discovery was needed.  Id. at 299, 307. 
143. Id. at 304 (citation omitted). 
144. Id. 
145. 687 F. Supp. 2d 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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seemed to find an attorney’s conduct offensive—stating that 
“Slamowitz’s testimony . . . lack[ed] [] credibility based on his lack of 
facility in answering basic questions about his practice and the Miller 
file, his demeanor on the witness stand, and his interest in the outcome of 
these proceedings.”146  The court further stated that Slamowitz’s 
“familiarity with his own firm’s files, both paper and electronic, was 
woefully inadequate for a man who professed to be an experienced and 
able collections attorney, confident in the systems and processes in place 
that guided his work.”147 
While most of these cases involve attorneys who did little more than 
review the basic information provided to them by their clients prior to 
printing and sending a dunning letter to the debtor, several cases suggest 
that the filing of a lawsuit without having evidence of a debt is not a 
violation of the FDCPA.
148
 
In Harvey v. Great Seneca Financial Corporation,
149
 the court 
concluded that “the filing of a debt collection-lawsuit without the 
immediate means of proving the debt” does not violate the FDCPA.150  
The court noted that this was not a “deceptive practice” in violation of § 
1692e.
151
  Moreover, the court in Slanina v. United Recovery Systems, 
LP,
152
 granted a motion to dismiss, even though a collection agency sent 
a dunning letter to Slania demanding payment of a debt.
153
  The court 
granted the motion “because there is no obligation under the FDCPA for 
a debt collector to verify a debt prior to collection.”154  Likewise in 
Derricotte v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP,
155
 the court found, that although 
the firm “appears to have acted upon the information provided by its 
client,” there was no violation of the FDCPA in pursuing a lawsuit 
without the requisite evidence of a debt.
156
 
 
146. See id. at 99. 
147. Id. 
148. See Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Slanina v. United Recovery Sys., LP, No. 3:11-CV-1391, 2011 WL 5008367, at *2-3 
(M.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2011); Derricotte v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, No. 10-1323, 2011 WL 
2971540, at *6 (D.N.J. July 19, 2011). 
149. 453 F.3d at 324. 
150. See id. at 330. 
151. Id. at 331. 
152. 2011 WL 5008367, at *1. 
153. See id. 
154. Id. at *2. 
155. 2011 WL 2971540, at *1. 
156. See id. at *6. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/7
  
1258 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  34:3 
These cases, while not directly involving “meaningful involvement” 
claims, show that an attorney can pursue legal action against a debtor 
without having complete evidence of a debt—seemingly less 
involvement than issuing a dunning letter without reviewing information 
beyond basic pedigree information of a debtor.  They do, however, pose 
some of the same ethical questions.  Moreover, in the case of filing a 
lawsuit without evidence of the debt, the threat of legal action is no 
longer a threat, it has come to fruition.  The MRPC provides that, “a 
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.”157  If a dunning letter is sent prior to litigation, 
with the intent to proceed to litigation, then it should follow that Rule 1.3 
would require attorneys to perform their due diligence prior to filing 
legal action.  Thus, the issue should not even proceed under the FDCPA 
and should be an issue solely for attorney discipline by the states.  
However, another issue was added to the “meaningful involvement” 
doctrine and further muddied the waters when a law firm was permitted 
to appropriately disclose their level of involvement in collecting a debt. 
 
B. Disclaimer of “Meaningful Involvement” 
 
1.  Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas L.L.P.
158
 
 
The case of Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P. created a 
change in the “meaningful involvement” doctrine by allowing a 
disclaimer of attorney involvement to be included in a dunning letter 
without violating the FDCPA.
159
  In Greco, plaintiff-debtor Andrew 
Greco received a dunning letter from the defendants Trauner, Cohen & 
Thomas, L.L.P on their firm letterhead.
160
  The letter stated that the law 
firm represented Bank of America and also contained the § 1692g 
requirements.
161
  The letter also included the following sentence: “At this 
time, no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular 
circumstances of your account.”162  The letter was not signed by an 
individual attorney, but had the law firm’s name in the signature block.163  
 
157. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2013). 
158. 412 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 2005). 
159. See id. at 365. 
160. Id. at 361. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 362. 
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Andrew Greco then filed a lawsuit against the law firm and the attorneys 
in their individual capacity claiming violations of § 1692e and § 
1692g.
164
  His suit specifically claimed that the defendants violated § 
1692e(3) and § 1692e(10) by misrepresenting the amount of “attorney 
involvement” in the dunning letter.165 
Applying the least sophisticated consumer standard,
166
 the district 
court determined, as a matter of law, that there were no violations of the 
FDCPA because the dunning letter “was not misleading in its 
representation of attorney involvement.”167  The district court concluded 
the letter “prominently stated in normal typeface that ‘[a]t this time, no 
attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular 
circumstances of your account.’”168  Moreover, it reasoned that “the least 
sophisticated of debtors would understand that . . . no attorney had yet 
recommended filing a lawsuit.”169 
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Greco argued that by placing the 
dunning letter on law firm letterhead and having the law firm’s name in 
the signature block, a violation of § 1692e occurred.
170
  Greco asserted 
that “an attorney cannot send a collection letter without being 
meaningfully involved as an attorney within the collection process.”171  
Greco argued that the dunning letter here was similar to those in Clomon 
v. Jackson
172
 and Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.,
173
 and therefore, 
the defendants violated § 1692e.
174
 
In its analysis, the Second Circuit articulated that “Greco’s claim 
rests on a misunderstanding of the FDCPA’s requirements, and of [the 
court’s] prior explications of that statute.”175  The Second Circuit further 
reasoned that it does not follow from the FDCPA that attorneys may 
participate in the process of debt collection only by providing legal 
services—they may provide other services so long as their status as an 
 
164. Id.  The court’s discussion of the § 1692g claim is not relevant to the issue of 
“meaningful involvement.” 
165. Id. (emphasis added). 
166. See supra Part III.B.1. 
167. See Greco, 412 F.3d at 362. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 362-63 (emphasis added). 
170. Id. at 363. 
171. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
172. See 988 F.2d 1314, 1321 (2d Cir. 1993). 
173. See 321 F.3d 292, 301 (2d Cir. 2003). 
174. See Greco, 412 F.3d at 364. 
175. Id. 
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attorney does not mislead a debtor.
176
  The court continued by stating that 
“prior precedents” allowed “disclaimers that should make clear even to 
the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ that the law firm or attorney sending 
the letter is not, at the time of the letter’s transmission, acting as an 
attorney.”177  Finally, the court noted that a dunning letter on law firm 
letterhead represents involvement by an attorney, but it is an implied 
level of involvement.
178
  Distinguishing the dunning letter in Greco from 
those in Clomon and Miller, the Second Circuit found that the disclaimer 
in Greco’s letter was “clear” and “explain[ed] the limited extent of 
[attorney] involvement in the collection of Greco’s debt.”179  Thus, even 
the least sophisticated debtor would be able to understand that this letter 
intended no attorney involvement.
180
 
 
2.  Other Disclaimer Cases 
 
Several other courts have been faced with whether a disclaimer is 
sufficient to comport with the FDCPA.
181
  In Gonzalez v. Kay,
182
 the 
Fifth Circuit, citing to Greco, stated that a disclaimer shows “that the 
lawyer is wearing a ‘debt collector’ hat and not a ‘lawyer’ hat when 
 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 365. 
180. Id. 
181. Compare Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 1003 
(3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting a disclaimer when placed on the back), Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 
F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2009) (same), Robertson v. Richard J. Boudreau & Assocs., LLC, 
No. C09-1681 BZ, 2009 WL 5108479, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009) (rejecting Greco 
as unpersuasive), and Dunn v. Derrick E. McGavic, P.C., 653 F. Supp. 2d. 1109, 1114 
(D. Or. 2009) (finding the dunning letter more convoluted than the dunning letter in 
Greco), with Eddis v. Midland Funding, L.L.C., No. 11-3923 (JBS/AMD), 2012 WL 
664812, at *6-9 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2012) (discussing Greco and Lesher and finding that the 
disclaimer on the front of the dunning letter did not violate the FDCPA), Martsolf v. JBC 
Legal Group, P.C., No. 1:04-CV-1346, 2008 WL 275719, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008) 
(holding defendant liable because “[t]he letters do not include a disclaimer stating that no 
attorney has personally reviewed the debt.”), Navarro v. Eskanos & Adler, No. C 06-
02231 WHA, 2007 WL 549904, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2007 (denying the defendant’s 
summary judgment because “[t]he letter contains no disclaimer of an attorney’s 
involvement.”), and Pujol v. Universal Fid. Corp., No. 03 CV 5524 (JG), 2004 WL 
1278163, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2004) (dismissing plaintiff’s case because the 
disclaimer, “I have not, nor will I, review each detail of your account status, unless you 
so request” would not make the least sophisticated consumer believe that an attorney had 
reviewed the file). 
182. 577 F.3d at 600. 
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sending out [a dunning] letter.”183  Although the disclaimer in Gonzalez 
was exactly the same as the one in Greco,
 184
 the Fifth Circuit found its 
placement on the back of the dunning letter violated the FDCPA.
185
  The 
court reasoned through a sliding-scale approach that some letters “are not 
deceptive based on the language and placement of the disclaimer,” some 
letters “violate the FDCPA as a matter of law,” and others are “[i]n the 
middle . . . [and] include contradictory messages.”186  The court 
continued by determining that disclaimers are not per se unenforceable, 
stating that, “[t]he disclaimer must explain to even the least sophisticated 
consumer that lawyers may also be debt collectors and that the lawyer is 
operating only as a debt collector at that time.”187  However, the 
dissenting judge noted that the dunning letter “conforms in every respect 
to the standards for legality recognized by the Second Circuit in Greco” 
and the majority “effectively creat[ed] a circuit split” by distinguishing 
placement of the disclaimer.
188
  Moreover, in Lesher v. Law Offices of 
Mitchell N. Kay, PC
189
 the Third Circuit, dealing with the same 
disclaimer as in Greco
190
 and almost the exact same dunning letter as in 
Gonzalez,
191
 held that a disclaimer on the back violated the FDCPA.
192
  
The dissent by Circuit Judge Jordan in Lesher
193
 agreed with the dissent 
by Circuit Judge Jolly in Gonzalez.
194
  Circuit Judge Jordan, stated that 
Circuit Judge Jolly was “exactly correct” and further said, “[w]ithout 
legal mumbo jumbo, [the] disclaimer tells any reasonable reader, 
including the least sophisticated, that, ‘while this was a letter from a law 
firm, no attorney had specifically examined the recipient’s account 
information.”195  Finally, in Eddis v. Midland Funding, L.L.C.,196 the 
 
183. See id. at 604 (citing Greco, 412 F.3d at 361-62). 
184. Id. at 602, 606; Greco, 412 F.3d at 361. 
185. See Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 607. 
186. See id. at 606; see also Laurie A. Lucas & Mike Voorhees, Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act: The Regulatory Environment and Recent Appellate Cases, 65 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4, 13 (2011). 
187. See Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 607. 
188. See id. at 607. (Jolly, J., dissenting). 
189. 650 F.3d 993 (3d Cir. 2011). 
190. See Greco v. Trauner, Cohen, & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
191. See 577 F.3d at 602 (majority opinion). 
192. See Lesher, 650 F.3d at 1001. 
193. See id. at 1004-07 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
194. See 577 F.3d at 607-12 (Jolly, J., dissenting). 
195. See id. at 1006. 
196. See Eddis v. Midland Funding, L.L.C., No. 11-3923 (JBS/AMD), 2012 WL 
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District of New Jersey, comparing the same disclaimer as in Greco
197
 and 
Lesher,
198
 determined that the disclaimer did not violate the FDCPA 
because the content of the disclaimer was sufficient and it was in the 
main text of the dunning letter.
199
 
Faced with another argument by the plaintiff, the district court in 
Eddis further rejected the notion that the New Jersey Rules of 
Professional Conduct provided a private cause of action and thus a 
violation § 1692e of the FDCPA.
200
  The Eddis court noted that several 
other district courts had determined that “unauthorized practice of law 
claims are not cognizable under the FDCPA.”201  Moreover, the court 
reasoned that the New Jersey Supreme Court had stated that there could 
be no independent causes of action based on a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.
202
 
Allowing an attorney to waive involvement in a case to comport 
with the FDCPA may seem troubling to consumer-debtors.  After all, an 
attorney, whether involved in the debt collection process or some other 
field, must be cognizant of their responsibilities to the legal profession as 
a whole.  The due diligence requirements of MRPC 1.3 are only one 
requirement that attorneys must follow.  States may provide their own 
interpretation of ethical rules through ethics opinions.  Thus, in light of 
the Ethics Opinion, the disclaimer in Greco that was found to comport 
with the FDCPA in Eddis, was struck down. 
 
V. The Ethics Opinion 
 
A. Discussion of the Ethics Opinion 
 
Directed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Committee on the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law (“UPLC”) and the Advisory Committee 
on Professional Ethics (“ACPE”), reviewed several prior ethics opinions 
 
664812, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2012). 
197. See Greco v. Trauner, Cohen, & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
198. See 650 F.3d at 1001 (majority opinion). 
199. See Eddis, 2012 WL 664812, at *8-9. 
200. See id. at *9. 
201. See id. (quoting Cohen v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., No. 08 1084 (SRC), 
2008 WL 4513569, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(collecting cases)). 
202. See Eddis, 2012 WL 664812, at *10 (citing Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.2d 271, 277 
(N.J. 1998)). 
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issued by their respective bodies
203
 and reaffirmed their rulings.
204
  The 
Ethics Opinion also “reaffirm[ed] that, before sending a [dunning] letter, 
lawyers must exercise professional judgment by independently 
evaluating collection demands and determining that proceedings to 
enforce collection are warranted.”205  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
asked for review by the joint ethics committees after imposing discipline 
on an attorney for renting his name and letterhead to a collection 
agency.
206
  Furthermore, the attorney exercised no judgment in collecting 
debts.
207
  The collection agency engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law and the attorney violated two separate New Jersey Rules of 
Professional Conduct.
208
 
The Ethics Opinion further stated that an ABA ethics opinion 
addressed the same issue and ruled that a lawyer must have independent 
judgment over dunning letters.
209
  Agreeing with the ABA opinion, the 
Ethics Opinion stated that, “[e]xercising independent professional 
judgment is a fundamental and indispensable element of the practice of 
law.  A lawyer who fails to exercise independent professional judgment 
has abdicated the practice of law, has demonstrated a lack of 
competence, and has committed gross negligence, in violation of [NJ] 
RPC 1.1(a).”210 
The Ethics Opinion, noting that the FDCPA and the New Jersey 
Rules of Professional Conduct “are distinct bodies of law,”211 discussed 
 
203. See UPLC Op. 8, 95 N.J. L.J. 105 (1972) (determining that a collection agency 
sending a dunning letter to a debtor threatening legal action or implying that the dunning 
letter was sent at the request of an attorney is the unauthorized practice of law); see also 
ACPE Op. 259, 96 N.J. L.J. 754 (1973) (finding a violation of ethical duties if an attorney 
lends their letterhead to clients to place on dunning letters); see generally ACPE Op. 506, 
110 N.J. L.J. 408 (1982) (discussing the same and stating that “Opinion 259 remains the 
guide in this area”). 
204. Ethics Opinion, supra note 8. 
205. See id. 
206. See id.  This conduct is also not allowed by the FDCPA.  See supra note 103 
and accompanying text. 
207. See Ethics Opinion, supra note 8. 
208. See id.  The attorney “violated [NJ] RPC 5.5(a)(2) (assisting a nonlawyer in 
the unauthorized practice of law) and [NJ] RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).”  Id. 
209. ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1368 (1976) 
(discussing “Mass Mailing of Form Collection Letters”). 
210. See Ethics Opinion, supra note 8, at 59 n.1 (“RPC 1.1(a) (Competence) 
provides that ‘[a] lawyer shall not . . . [h]andle or neglect a matter entrusted to the lawyer 
in such manner that the lawyer’s conduct constitutes gross negligence.’”). 
211. See id. at 59. 
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several FDCPA cases which “differentiate between lawyers acting in a 
‘lawyer capacity’—which would require the exercise of professional 
judgment and meaningful involvement in the collection matter—and 
lawyers not acting in a ‘lawyer capacity,’ acting as a lay debt 
collection.”212  Moreover, the Ethics Opinion states that even if the 
FDCPA allows a law firm to send dunning letters in a lay capacity, the 
New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct have forbidden it.
213
  Finally, 
the Ethics Opinion ruled: 
 
A lawyer cannot disclaim the fact that he or she is 
engaging in the practice of law when using law firm 
letterhead.  A lawyer who has not reviewed the file, 
made appropriate inquiry, and exercised professional 
judgment has engaged in an incompetent and grossly 
negligent practice of law in violation of RPC 1.1(a).  A 
lawyer who permits office staff, or a client, to send 
[dunning] letters when the lawyer has not individually 
reviewed the file, made appropriate inquiry, and 
exercised professional judgment, is assisting in 
unauthorized practice of law in violation of [NJ] RPC 
5.5(a)(2) and engaging in deceitful conduct in violation 
of [NJ] RPC 8.4(c).
214
 
 
B. The Resulting Effects 
 
In the aftermath of the Ethics Opinion, New Jersey attorneys are no 
longer allowed to use the disclaimer made prevalent by the Second 
Circuit in Greco.
215
  As one attorney has noted, it “should be seen as the 
equivalent of a ‘Please Kick Me’ sign placed on one’s back as it may 
lead to an inquiry by the Office of Attorney Ethics.”216  Because the 
attorneys are “engaged in the practice of law,” they are not allowed to 
 
212. See id. (discussing Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 
993, 1003 (3d Cir. 2011), Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2009), Miller v. 
Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 301 (2d Cir. 2003), and Avila v. Rubin 84 
F.3d 222, 229 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
213. See Ethics Opinion, supra note 8. 
214. See id. 
215. See Maurice, supra note 9 (citing In re Goldstein, 560 A.2d 1166, 1167 (N.J. 
1989)). 
216. See id. 
25
PETERS - FINAL  
2014]  MEANINGFUL INVOLVEMENT IN COLLECTIONS  1265 
use a disclaimer stating that they are not acting as an attorney.
217
  While 
the Ethics Opinion noted that the FDCPA and the New Jersey Rules of 
Professional Conduct “are distinct bodies of law,”218 it seems that this 
ruling effectively strengthens the “meaningful involvement” doctrine and 
requires more than that doctrine deems adequate.  Moreover, it forbids 
New Jersey attorneys from a certain practice under a federal statute that 
attorneys in other states can use.  Thus, it destroys any uniformity the 
federal courts have in applying federal law across the states. 
 
VI. The Remedy 
 
In order to increase uniformity and resolve “effectively creat[ed] [] 
circuit split[s]”219 in the application of the FDCPA, several remedies are 
available.  As suggested earlier, the federal courts should adopt a 
consistent standard of review for violations of the FDCPA.
220
  In doing 
so, attorneys and consumer-debtors will be aware of the standard that 
dunning letters must meet to comply with the FDCPA and it will have a 
uniform name, like the “the reasonable person of tort law.”221 
A congressional amendment to the FDCPA to include “meaningful 
involvement” is both unlikely and insufficient to solve the issue.  It is 
unlikely to provide the correct solution because the issues presented by 
the doctrine are properly handled by the states through attorney 
discipline, although the Avila court believed that a lack of “meaningful 
involvement” could result in “derogation of professional standards.”222  
MRPC 1.3 requires attorney to meet diligence requirements.
223
  Also, 
MRPC 5.5(a) prevents lawyers from assisting others in the unauthorized 
practice of law.
224
  If these rules are more strictly enforced by the states, 
the FDCPA can prevent the abusive debt collection practices it is meant 
to prevent rather than lawsuits for statutory damages only.  Furthermore, 
once litigation ensues against a consumer-debtor, they know that an 
attorney is involved in the case.  This is proven through case law, which 
 
217. See id. 
218. See Ethics Opinion, supra note 8. 
219. Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2009) (Jolly, J., dissenting). 
220. See supra Part III.B.3. 
221. Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1259 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
222. Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 229 (7th Cir. 1996). 
223. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2013). 
224. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2013). 
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has determined attorneys who file a lawsuit without having evidence of a 
debt do not violate the FDCPA.
225
 
The disclaimer of involvement that was made prevalent through 
Greco
226
 should be struck down by the federal courts as the Ethics 
Opinion has provided.  An attorney should not be allowed to wear 
multiple hats in the debt collection field because they will always have 
their title of attorney.  This title carries with it professional 
responsibilities and will prevent ethical obligations from being pulled 
into the FDCPA.
227
  If more states adopt an Ethics Opinion like New 
Jersey’s, then those states would be taking a stand by regulating attorney 
ethics more strictly.  This would also provide the opportunity for 
increased compliance with the FDCPA and uniformity in applying it 
across the states.  Moreover, consumer-debtors would also be put in a 
better position by knowing that an attorney could not waive involvement 
in sending a dunning letter. 
If these lawsuits continue to go forward, a rebuttable presumption 
should apply to the defendant-attorney.  The presumption in each case 
should be that the attorney has maintained the requisite standard of 
ethical behavior if that attorney has not had any past ethical violations as 
a result of renting out letterhead.  A standard requiring the plaintiff to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the attorney violated ethical 
responsibilities and failed to comply with the FDCPA in letterhead cases 
will diminish the use of ethical-like violations to award debtors statutory 
damages where no actual damages are proved.  By limiting these suits to 
blatant violations like renting letterhead to a collection agency, the 
FDCPA will continue in its proper purpose. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
Part of the FDCPA’s purpose is “to promote consistent State 
action.”228  By leaving it to the states to regulate attorney discipline, the 
federal courts will not have to make unnecessary determinations of 
attorney ethical responsibilities and will be faced with FDCPA lawsuits 
 
225. See Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Slanina v. United Recovery Sys., LP, No. 3:11-CV-1391, 2011 WL 5008367, at *2-3 
(M.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2011); Derricotte v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, No. 10-1323, 2011 WL 
2971540, at *6 (D.N.J. July 19, 2011). 
226. See Greco v. Trauner, Cohen, & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 2005). 
227. See Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 229 (7th Cir. 1996). 
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012). 
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that truly protect consumer-debtors.  Moreover, since a private cause of 
action cannot be brought under the MRPC, and these FDCPA violations 
are very similar in nature, the FDCPA should not permit them either.  
Doing so only creates a further divide in the uniform application of the 
FDCPA.  Therefore, ethics should govern. 
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